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Murdock: Water Law - A Postscript to the Mutual Prescription Doctrine - Ci

CASE NOTES
WATER LAW-A Postscript to the Mutual Prescription Doctrine-City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).*

Plaintiff city of Los Angeles operates an extensive

water acquisition system within California for its distribution area located within the Upper Los Angeles River Area
or, to be acronymic, the ULARA. Waters imported from the
Owens Valley and Mono Basin constitute the exclusive source
of water for most of the distribution area. However, for
some portions of the plaintiff's distribution area, reliance
is made upon the groundwater found in the ULARA. Comprising the ULARA Basin are four subareas: San Fernando
(constituting 91% of the total area), Sylmar, Verdugo and
Eagle Rock.' The defendants, the cities of Burbank, Glendale and San Fernando, as well as the Crescenta Valley
County Water District and several private defendants,' have
also used in varying degrees the waters underlying the
ULARA for their water needs.'
To protect its rights to the disputed ULARA groundwater from prescription, the plaintiff brought suit asking
that the court:
1) quiet plaintiff's title in such water;
Copyright D 1976 by the University of Wyoming

*This case note was partially financed by the Water Resources Research
Institute of the University of Wyoming.
1. Plaintiff extracted groundwater from the San Fernando and Sylmar subareas. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537
P.2d 1250, 1259, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). Although the city of Los Angeles
did not extract water from the Verdugo subarea, it did claim that it was
a tributary to the Los Angeles River and thus its waters were included
within plaintiff's pueblo right. Id. at 1269. Eagle Rock subarea water was
not included in the court's determination as no specific issue was raised
with regard to it. Id. at 1259.
2. Id. at 1259. Numerous defendants were named but eliminated before trial.
For the purpose of this case note, the approximately 16 nongovernmental
parties are simply referred to as private parties. See at 1259 n.1 for a
complete list of private defendants.
3. Id. at 1260. Defendant city of San Fernando at the commencement of the
suit was entirely dependent upon the Sylmar subarea for its municipal
water needs. However, during the approximately 20 years of litigation, San
Fernando has since supplemented its water supply with water from the
Municipal Water District or MWD. Defendant city of Burbank and the
Crescenta Valley County Water District supplement their MWD water
with extractions from the San Fernando and Verdugo subareas respectively.
City of Glendale extracts water from both the Verdugo and San Fernando
subareas as well as purchasing MWD water.
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2) declare, on the basis of its pueblo right4 recognized
in City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale,5 plaintiff's prior right to all native water underlying the
ULARA inclusive of the San Fernando, Sylmar and
Verdugo subareas;
3) recognize plaintiff's prior right to all water recharging the ULARA subareas attributable to return flow
from the imported water supplied to plaintiff's customers ;' and
4) enjoin the defendant's extraction of any groundwater to which the plaintiff had a prior right except
in subordination to that right.'
The trial court ruled that the plaintiff's pueblo right
was unsubstantiated historically and, consequently, did not
accord plaintiff any prior right to the waters underlying the
ULARA. Additionally, it found that the four subareas of
the ULARA were hydrologically independent. Most importantly, the court found that five years prior to the initiation
of the suit an overdraft' had occurred in the subareas in
4. A pueblo right has been defined as "the paramount right of an American
city as successor of a Spanish or Mexican pueblo (primitive village or
town) to the use of water naturally occurring within the old pueblo limits
for the use of the city and its inhabitants." HUTCHINS, 2 WATER RIGHTS
LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 145 (1974). For a more adequate
examination of the character of the right in California, see discussion at
147-59. For an older but respected treatment, see KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND
WATER 2590-93 (1912).
5. 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289, 292 (1943).
6. Id. at 294-295. The California Supreme Court recognized the plaintiff
city's rights to all such water which had been delivered to agricultural
customers. By the commencement of the Los Angeles suit, this agricultural
clientele had largely been displaced by urban expansion. City of Los Angeles
v. City of San Fernando, supra note 1, at 1262.
7. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra note 1, at 1258-59.
8. California has adopted a measure of overdraft based on hydrologic renewability rather than economic feasibility of extraction. The Los Angeles
court found that an overdraft occurred when extractions depleted "surplus
water" or water which "could be withdrawn without adverse effects on the
basin's long term supply." Id. at 1307. Stated by formula, overdraft occurs
when extractions exceed safe yield. Safe yield, in turn, was defined as "net
ground water recharge, consisting of (A) recharge from (1) native precipitation and associated runoff, (2) return flow from delivered imported
water, and (3) return flow from delivered ground water less (B) losses
incurred through natural ground water depletions consisting of (1) subsurface outflow, (2) excessive evaporative losses in high ground water
areas and through vegetation along streams, (3) ground water infiltration into sewers, and (4) rising water outflow, or water emerging from
the ground and flowing . . . to the sea." Id. at 1308.
Although safe yield might be conceptualized so as to provide an analogue in the "mining" context, as applied here it is primarily a measure designed to maintain basin equilibrium confining extractions to an amount
of water equal to that which replenishes the basin through recharge. For
a discussion of the concept in the mining context, see Bagley, Water Rights
Law and Public Policies Relating to Ground Water "Mining" in the Southwestern States, 4 J. LAW & ECON. 144, 166-67 (1961).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss1/4

2

Murdock: Water Law - A Postscript to the Mutual Prescription Doctrine - Ci

1976

CASE NOTES

question. As a result of the overdraft, the court ruled that
a prescriptive period had ensued in which each party had
acquired prescriptive rights against all others taking water
from the basin. Finally, the court apportioned the parties'
pumping rights on a pro rata basis in accord with the procedure set forth in City of Pasadenav. City of Alhambra.'
Upon appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the
trial court's decision in several significant areas.'" By (1)
recognizing as applicable to groundwater the exemption of
municipalities from prescription, (2) imposing a more stringent standard to establish notice of adverse use, and (3)
adopting a new formula for allocation of groundwater in an
overdrafted basin, the California court substantially qualified what was thought to be the "mutual prescription doctrine" established in the Pasadenacase.
EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF BASIN GROUNDWATER

In assessing the significance of the Los Angeles decision,
it is necessary to examine the impact of the mutual prescription doctrine within the overall context of basin utilization.
The groundwater of the United States represents one
of its greatest resources.11 Effective utilization of this resource, as with any resource, is an objective toward which
the legal system must strive. Unfortunately, the goal of
effective utilization by achieving "the maximum benefit in
terms of water supply at minimum cost"' 2 has been administratively elusive."5 Indeed, the mutual prescription doctrine
would not have been created had groundwater basins been
effectively utilized and overdrafts prevented.
9. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17. 32-33 (1949).
10. A significant portion of the decision dealt with the pueblo right asserted by
Los Angeles. The court upheld Los Angeles' right to native water in the
San Fernando subbasin on that basis, but refused to extend the scope of
that right beyond the San Fernando subbasin. In the interests of space,
this note must content itself with an examination of the decision's effect
on the "mutual prescription doctrine" or Pasadenarule.
11. Hutchins, Ground Water Legislation,30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 416, 437 (1958);
Moses, The Law of Ground Water-Does Modern Buried Treasure Create
A New Breed of Pirates, 11 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 277, 277-78 (1966).
12. Krieger and Banks, Ground Water Basin Management, 50 CAL. L. REV. 56
56-57 (1962).
13. Reis, A Review and Revitalization: Concepts of Ground Water Production
and Management-The California Experience, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES J.
53, 82-86 (1967) ; Krieger and Banks, supra note 12, at 58.
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Logically, it must be asked then why do overdrafts occur
at all. To a certain extent, overdrafts are directly attributable to the hydrological complexities of the basin. 4 These
complexities are most confounding in the determination of
safe yields and the related prevention of overdrafts. Before
safe yields can be accurately predicted, a rather complete
catalogue of hydrological factors from absorption rates to
groundwater lost to sewer infiltration must be available.15
Ideally, the gathered data used to calculate such factors accurately reflects the conditions existing at the time of prediction. Yet, the time lag beween data acquisition and their
interpretation for predictive purposes is crucial where the
physical conditions causally related to these factors are rapidly changing. Ironically, the very social conditions, such as
urbanization and industrialization, which place the greatest
demands upon basin groundwater and thus necessitate the
acquisition of "safe yield" data may also change the geography or physical surface conditions so drastically in the
time after the data is taken as to render the resultant predictions unreliable." Coupled with the high, if not prohibitive, cost of hydrological surveys, 7 the possibility of obsolescent data makes accurate safe yield predictions during increasing urban and industrial expansion extremely difficult.
Yet, it might be thought that the knowledge that safe
yield predictions were uncertain would result in a tendency
toward underprediction, or underextraction, lessening the
possibility of overdraft.
Counterbalancing this expected tendency is the opportunity cost associated with the underprediction or the loss of
14. Krieger and Banks, supra note 12, at 57; Moses, supra note 11, at 293-94.
15. These were only two of many factors considered by the Los Angeles court.
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra note 1, at 1308. See
Krieger and Banks, supra note 12, at 57, for a consideration of factors
necessary for prediction of safe yield.
16. For example, the construction of concrete or asphalt roads and the concreting of channels adversely affect absorption and may result in a reduced
recharge. If such activity occurs after the collection of the safe yield data,
the predictions must be adjusted by approximation or augmented by better
data. Krieger and Banks, supra note 12, at 57. _
17. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. City of Pasadena, supra note 1, at 1269-70 concerning expenses of State Water Resources Control Board. Although the
$493,264 included other costs, it would be assumed that the major portion
was spent on the watermaster's collection of data and submission of reports
to the court.
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the net benefit which would have been gained had water
unused because of underprediction been developed. Consequently, the proclivity to under- or overpredict is theoretically
determined by a comparison of overdraft costs with opportunity costs. To the extent that external costs such as salt
water intrusion, subsidence and compactification are not included in the overdraft costs, there will be an underevaluation of the overdraft costs and, concomitantly, a relative
tendency toward overprediction and overdraft."8
Given the likelihood of basin overdraft, especially when
a rapidly expanding economy demands more groundwater
than the safe yield can supply, what administrative solutions19 can best resolve the attendant competing economic
needs for the basin groundwater? At this point, it is important to distinguish the legal basis for a pro rata pumping
reduction of all basin users from its immediate administrative and economic effect. While the individual state's legal
groundwater doctrine may determine whether such an administrative solution is imposed due to prescription," an
exercise of administrative discretion2 or statutory necessity," it is posited that a system which entails a pro rata solution to overdraft problems will undergo economic tendencies
which vary remakably little regardless of the legal mechanism which allowed the overdraft to occur. Examination of
18. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability RulesA Comment, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968); Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Though the above are concerned primarily with pollution, the conceptual framework presented by each is
equally applicable to the context of groundwater and its transactional costs,
both social and hydrological. The apparent inability of California utilizers
to anticipate subsidence and salt water intrusion, not to mention costs associated with urban growth, perhaps, overstimulated by "cheap water," are
all external costs of groundwater basin development.
19. The panorama of solutions to overdrafted basins is extensive. Cf. Clark,
Groundwater Management: Law and Local Response, 6 ARMz. L. REV. 178,
200-06 (1965).
20. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, supra note 9, at 32-33.
21. Cf. WYO. STAT. § 41-132 (Supp. 1975). Although Wyoming is a prior appropriation state, a pro rata solution is still available.
22. Cf. So. DAK. COMPILED LAWs 46-6-6.2 (1974). This statute would seem to
adopt the pro rata reduction solution modified by priority being given to
wells pumping for domestic use.
23. It must be noted that characteristics of each individual legal system may be
capable of controlling the dysfunctional tendencies, namely, economic distortion with regard to ownership of water rights and the value thereof,
created by use of a pro rata solution. For instance, a more cautious granting of permits for drilling or the election of the pro rata solution only
when hydrological necessities dictate would (1) lessen the opportunity to
extract water from other basins and (2) reduce the utility of drilling in a
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the California experience in resolving its overdraft situations through proportional reduction in pumping by all
parties" provides insight into the problems inherent in the
pro rata solution.
THE LAW BEFORE Los Angeles: THE Pasadena RULE
OF MUTUAL PRESCRIPTION

In 1949 the California Supreme Court enunciated the
mutual prescription doctrine, creating what many believed
to be the major legal impetus for overdevelopment of California groundwater basins.2 1 In Pasadena,the court departed from the standard forwarded in Katz v. Walkinshaw °
which would have required satisfaction of overlying users'
needs first, with any other water apportioned to appropriators according to the date of their appropriations. 7
Instead, the Pasadenacourt reasoned that since the safe
yield had been exceeded for a number of years, each party
who had extracted water from the basin had caused injury
to every other party extracting groundwater. Since this injury had occurred for the short five year period prescribed
in the California adverse possession statute," the Pasadena
court held that each junior user acquired a "prescriptive
right" against all overlying users and those senior in appropriation to him. The court refused to explain whether the

24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

basin which may be close to overdrafting. However, a cautious approach
may not be feasible to the extent that demands for utilization are high
and externalities associated with overdrafting are not internalized. Indeed,
one accompanying effect of the institution of a pro rata solution in Basin
X may be increased demands for water in other basins, as the fear of losing capital expended in establishing a well may be reduced by the expectancy of a pro rata reduction in the future.
Even within basins where overdrafting occurs and denial of additional
permits provides no remedy, there may be a decreased tendency to assert
an overdraft by users due to the deterrent effect of the expense of ascertaining the overdraft condition and the decreased incentive of an adjusted
pro rata share once the overdraft is established.
It is of course true that California has only employed this solution when a
five year prescriptive period of overdraft has occurred. However, the Los
Angeles court implied that such a solution could be utilized even if no prescriptive rights were acquired. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando,
supra note 1, at 1298.
Krieger and Banks, supra note 12, at 61-62; Reis, supra note 13, at 63-64.
This was also the Los Angeles court's conclusion. City of Los Angeles v.
City of San Fernando, supra note 1, at 1299-1300.
141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
Id. at 772.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 1954).
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, supra note 9, at 32.
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rights of overlying users and appropriators senior to a party
claiming prescription were retained by self-help in continuing to extract water or replaced completely with prescriptive rights against all other parties." A pro rata reduction
in extraction of all users was ordered, with each ration being
determined by a comparison of the amount pumped by each
party to the total pumped during the five years of the overdraft. However, because of the unique manner in which the
case developed, 1 the court did not specify whether prescriptive rights could be acquired against a municipal corporation invoking the protection of the broad exemptions found
in the adverse possession statute, Section 1007 of the Civil
Code. " Nor did the court examine what constituted notice
of adverse use during the prescriptive period, except to say
that a falling well level for twenty-nine consecutive years
was sufficient."
The question of the applicability of Section 1007 to the
water rights of a municipal corporation seemed to have been
30. Id. at 32-33. This portion of the Pasadena case has created debate by the
commentators. For the view that there never was a true "mutual prescription doctrine," see HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES, supra note 4, at 676-679. See Krieger and Banks, supra note 12, at
60-61, for the opposite view. It would seem the Los Angeles court adopted
the former view. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra note
1, at 1319 n.101.
31. The appellant, California-Michigan Land and Water Company, was the only
party which had not "entered into a stipulation for a judgment allocating
the water and restricting total production to the safe yield." Consequently,
none of the defendant cities were able to raise any defenses to prescription
gained against their water rights. City of Pasadena v. Alhambra, supra
note 9, at 23.
32. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1007 (West 1954) provided that:
Occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure as sufficient to bar any action for the recovery of the property confers a title thereto, denominated a title by prescription,
which is sufficient against all, but no possession by any person,
firm or corporation no matter how long continued of any land,
water, water right, easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to or owned by any county, city and county, city, irrigation
district, public or municipal corporation or any department or
agency thereof, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right
against such county, city and county, city, public or municipal
corporation, irrigation district, or any department or agency thereof or any agency created or authorized by the Constitution or any
law of this State for the administration of any State school, college or university. The exemption of certain classes of governmental property is intended as a limitation and shall not be deemed
to subject to the operation of this section any classes of governmental property which would not otherwise be subject thereto.
This section of the Code was amended in 1969 to include public utilities.
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra note 1, at 1302 n.67.
33. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, supra note 9, at 30-31.
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answered in the intermediate appellate decision of California
Water Service Co. v. Sidebothan & Son, Inc.34 Arising under
conditions very similar to Pasadena,California Water Service had one variation: the appellant was the municipality of
Hawthorne interposing as a defense to the mutual prescription the bar of Section 1007. The appellate court dismissed
the asserted defense on other grounds;5 but in the court's
dicta, it was clearly implied that water rights capable of
divestment, namely appropriative rights, would not fall within the application of Section 1007."
The Pasadenarule, amplified by CaliforniaWater Service, established that the open and notorious extraction of
water from a basin beyond one's appropriative or overlying
right for a five year period of overdraft resulted in the acquisition of prescriptive rights against all other users of the
groundwater, including municipal corporations. While the
mutual prescription doctrine of Pasadena might have been
doctrinally "repugnant to the concept of prescriptive
rights," 7 it did nevertheless provide a practical means of
adjusting rights to basin water, thus stabilizing an overdrafted basin.
However, beyond statutory authorization existing in
some states for a solution similar to that found in Pasadena,
pro rata reduction of all users seems to have enjoyed little
success outside of California. 8 On those occasions when the
Pasadena rule was advocated, the rationale for its use was
predicated upon the full utilization of the state's resources.99
However, courts rejected the deviation from already established rules which a pro rata solution would have required.
In that reliance upon established rules of adjudicating
groundwater rights would reinforce existing rights, the court
seemed to feel that the market would procure the best utilization of the water, as such rights could be purchased if a
more useful development would result.
34. 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 37 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id. at 7-8. Nor does it seem that a city could be an overlying user to any
significant extent. City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 2d
7, 198 P. 784, 791-92 (1921).
37. HUTCHINS, supra note 4, at 679.
38. Cf. Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. 75 Ida. 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).
39. Id. at 635-36.
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LATENT CONSEQUENCES OF THE

Pasadena RULE

As a result of Pasadena,California cities began to pump
as much water as possible in basins other than the Raymond
Basin. They had little to lose, since by increasing their ex-

tractions, cities could (1) increase their share of an adjusted
safe yield"° prescriptively, (2) retain their share of an ad-

justed safe yield by increasing their extractions in proportion to other users or (3) at least minimize their loss of the
adjusted safe yield by decreasing the proportion available

to other users."
In advancing the Pasadenarule, the court had sought to

encourage senior appropriators and overlying users to assert
their right early in the prescriptive period, thus preventing
overdraft of the basin.4" To the extent that the court hoped
for such a deterrent effect, it failed to assess the great infor40. Adjusted safe yield refers to the proportioned allowed extractions after
prescriptive rights were determined by the court.
41. Assume a basin with a continuous safe yield of 100 acre-ft. The following
four scenarios illustrate the respective strategies which A may follow (All
units represent acre-feet.):
Extractions During
Ad justed Right
Prescriptive Period
Legal Right
Party
Option 1: The Acquisitive Strategy
33.33
A
33.33
B

C

33.33

99.99"
Total
Option 2: The No-Gain Strategy
33.33
A
33.33
B
33.33
G

50

50
25
25

200

100

50
50
50

3 3.33
3;3.33
3;3.33

100
50

150
99.99*
Total
Option 3: The Minimization of Loss Strategy
40
33.33
A
50
33.33
B
50
33.33
G
99.99*
Total
Option 4: The Status Quo Strategy
33.33
A
33.33
B
33.33
G

140
33.33
50
50

9;9.99*
2;8.5
5.7
3J
3 5.7
99.9*
2J5.0
3 7.5
3 7.5

10 0
133.33
99.99*
Total
*Deviation from 100 due to round-off.
Cf. Reis, supra note 13, at 64 n.33.
42. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, supra note 9, at 32-33.
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mational costs associated with ascertaining the point at
which overdrafting occurs.4
If a party seeking an injunction overcame the formidable cost threshold of obtaining data, it still faced frustration. Initially, the party might find that no overdraft existed.
As an injunction could not be obtained for the taking of surplus water, the party's expenditures had netted nothing legally. Nor were the data of great value, for they were not
necessarily reliable for future years, as conditions determining the basin's recharge capability might change. Consequently, the benefits of instituting an injunctive suit were
minimal when compared with the costs. The less costly alternative quickly became obvious: the extraction of greater
water so as to preserve the party's rights vis-a'-vis other
users. While the Pasadena rule may have fulfilled the requirement of the California constitution by averting waste
of groundwater,44 it did so at considerable expense. The
hydrologically ignorant holder of a water right had little
recourse but to increase his extractions from the basin. The
incentives to overdraft were great, but the deterrents to
doing so were minimal, or non-existent. Thus, the Pasadena
remedy, which stabilized water rights in the Raymond Basin,45 had the unintended effect of creating economic distortion in other basins leading to serious overdevelopment of
those resources.
43. Reis, supra note 13, at 79. The magnitude of this cost was the subject of
much remedial legislative action. Id. at 64-66; Krieger and Banks, supra
note 12, at 64-69.
44. CAL. CONST. art. 14, §3. If one were to apply a concept of "waste" which
recognized the loss through unneeded or induced consumption (Krieger and
Banks, supra note 12, at 56), it is questionable whether the Pasadena decision actually averted waste. The economic distortion created when parties
did not know their rights or their value, and, furthermore, could not expend
the resources to determine the above, was conducive to overdrafting. This in
turn probably created the marketing of "cheap water" with its resultant
uneconomical 'induced' consumption. Cf. Reis, supra note 13, at 69 n.57.
45. It has also been suggested that Pasadenawas intended to encourage, if not
compel, parties to reach prejudgment agreement. Reis, supra note 13, at 5355. By essentially ratifying the agreement of a majority of the parties
below and requiring dissenters to comply with the agreement, the court was
in an administrative sense forcing the decision "downward." Parties were
required to reach some type of settlement for fear that withdrawal from
negotiations might result in an entirely unpalatable resolution which the
court might later make the recalcitrant party accept anyway.
Though this judicial intent might be said to have attained some success
(See Krieger and Banks, supra note 12, at 74-76), it has also demonstrated
its shortcomings. In terms of informational costs and time and money
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EROSION OF THE MUTUAL PRESCRIPTION DOCTRINE:
THE Los Angeles DECISION

In adjudicating the conflicting claims to water in the
Sylmar subarea,4" the Los Angeles court re-examined the
mutual prescription doctrine. First, it recognized Section
1007 of the Civil Code as exempting from prescription any
water right of a municipal corporation, whether appropriative, prescriptive or overlying.4" It also held that the language of the provision would not allow one member of the
protected class to acquire a prescriptive right against any
other member of that class. Accordingly, Los Angeles' prior
groundwater appropriations were protected from prescription attempted by either private users or municipalities. 8
In a manner consistent with Pasadena,the court refined
the definition of overdraft. In the Pasadena formula, overdraft was reached when extractions from the basin exceeded
the safe yield. The court, agreeing with the plaintiff, felt
the proper formula to be one which permitted a greater extraction than the safe yield, that is, extraction until the
"available water storage capacity of the basin was sufficient
to permit cycling of the safe yield throughout the twentynine year base period of wet and dry years without causing
a waste of water in the wet years."49 Extractions could exceed the normal safe yield if the effect of such extractions
was to create additional storage which could be utilized in
years of higher precipitation, thus resulting in conservation
of groundwater.
This redefinition also illustrated the difficulty of ascertaining, without some hydrological data, when an overdraft
occurred. This became extremely significant in establishing

46.

47.
48.
49.

spent in adjudication, it is a costly venture susceptible to encouraging
further pumping rather than adjudication of rights. It has also been ques.
tioned whether the agreements were inadequate with regard to impending
storage problems. Reis, supra note 13, at 79-82.
Because the native waters of the San Fernando subarea were held to belong
to Los Angeles under its pueblo right (City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando, supra note 1, at 1284-91) and no overdraft had occurred in the
Verdugo subarea (Id. at 1287-88.) only the waters of the Sylmar subarea
were in question with regard to prescriptive rights.
Id. at 1302-04.
Id. at 1304-07.
Id. at 1308.
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the requirements for notice sufficient to declare a prescriptive right. Since the hydrological situations presented in
Pasadena and other cases were of such a nature that the
continued dropping of the basin level could not be interpreted
except as an overdraft,"° the court failed to develop criteria
as to the requirement for notice of adversity. However, given
the hydrological complexities found in the Los Angeles case,
the court was forced to elucidate by differentiating notice
of asserted adversity from "notice of adversity in fact caused
by the actual commencement of overdraft."'" The court did
not specify what constituted notice of adversity in fact, but
it would seem that at a minimum the circumstances establishing notice of "adversity in fact" are those in which the
party against whom prescriptive rights are to be acquired
can reasonably ascertain that the lowering of the basin level
was an overdraft and not a reduction in temporary storage.
It is obvious that the burden of proof of establishing notice
of adversity under the Los Angeles rule will be much greater
than that under Pasadena.2
Assuming the existence of proper notice of adversity in
fact against a private defendant, a prescriptive right analogous to that dictated by Pasadena would not automatically
follow. If the rights or later appropriators under the Katz
rules would not be completely eliminated and the prior rightful use of a prescriptive party was "substantial" in proportion to that party's total extractions taken during the prescriptive period," the court would administer what might be
termed the "priority principle" variation of the rule. This
variation would first determine the prescriptive rights acquired against private defendants. Water would then be
50. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra. supra note 9, at 31; California
Water Service Co. v. Sidebotham & Son, Inc., supra note 34, at 4.
51. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra note 1, at 1311.
52. With regard to notice the appellate court which considered the Los Angeles
case said:
Defendant's claim of adversity was based on the fact that there
was a shortage of water in the basin. The proof of that fact was so
technically complicated, occupying the referee and the trial court
here as extensively as it did, that knowledge of its existence could
not be presumed.
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 28 Cal. App. 3d 905, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 86 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
53. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, supra note 1, at 1299.
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allocated to overlying users "less any amounts of such rights
lost by prescription." 4 The remaining water would then be
allocated by the court according to the priority principle:
"the one first in time is the one first in right," regardless of
whether the right is appropriative or prescriptive."
IMPACT OF

Los Angeles: HAS THE RACE ENDED?

By the Los Angeles decision, the court lessened the likelihood of overdevelopment of groundwater basins, and encouraged long-range water planning by cities. As cities and other
public entities representing the class of groundwater appropriators will be recognized as statutorily protected from prescription, the need to insure their prior rights by "racing to
the pump" will be eliminated. Due to the statutory exemption of cities and other public users, the total water to which
one can acquire a prescriptive right has been substantially
reduced, thus decreasing the utility of any attempt to acquire
prescriptive rights. In addition, the court has placed a barrier to gaining prescription even against statutorily unprotected basin users due to the difficulty of showing notice of
54. Id. at 1319. The prescriptive right gained would be the lesser of "the
amount of the prescriptive taking" or "enough water to make the ratio of
the prescriptive right [acquired against the private party] to the remaining rights of the private [party] .. .as favorable to the former in time of
subsequent shortage as it was throughout the prescriptive period . .. ."
Id. at 1318-19. Presumably, the amount of the prescriptive taking is the
average annual amount of water extracted beyond the safe yield during the
prescriptive period. If the safe yield of the basin were to increase, the
parties would share in that increment in the same proportion as the rights
had been allocated originally. Yet, should any party's share in the increment exceed his prescriptive taking, his share would be restricted to the
prescriptive taking. In this sense, Loe Angeles follows the Pasadena policy.
The appropriate allocation of water when an existing overlying user
has a greater use for the basin groundwater at a date subsequent to the
prescriptive period is dependent upon his need for that use during the
prescriptive period. Clearly, if it is an expansion of an "old" use, the
overlying user can legally anticipate no further allocation. Id. at 1318 n.100.
If the use is "new," an increased allocation would not be permitted if the
"need" for such a use had existed during the prescriptive period. On the
other hand, a new overlying use for which no need existed during the prescriptive period would probably take priority over any prescriptive rights
gained. Id.
The effect of an enirely new overlying user's need for water upon the
allocation of basin water after a prescriptive period was not examined in
Los Angeles. The alternatives would seem to be allocation of water being
predicated upon the nonexistence of the need during the prescriptive period
or being permitted as no prescriptive rights could be obtained against a
party not yet using the basin, whether the need for such a use existed or
not.
55. Id. at 1319.
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adversity which would comply with the requirement for notice set forth in Los Angeles.
The court's utilization of an alternative allocation formula to that found in Pasadenawas also aimed at alleviating
the overdevelopment of groundwater basins by substantially
lessening the advantages to be obtained in seeking prescriptive rights. A party pumping after the overdraft has begun
may receive nothing, as any prescriptive right gained might
be later in time and thus judicially unrecognized.56 Coupling
56.

This is illustrated in the following example which contrasts the outcomes
obtained under the Pasadena rule and Los Angeles "prior appropriation"
variation. Assume a basin with a safe yield of 200 acre-feet and five users
-A, B, C, D and E-all exempted from prescription save A, an overlying
user. Hypothesize as well the following relationships:
Party
A
B
C
D
E
Total

Acre-Feet Due Prior
to Prescription
25
50
25
50
50

Total Acre-Feet Pumped During
Prescription Period
25
50
50
75
100
300

200

If B, C, D and E's appropriative and prescriptive rights have priority
in that order, based upon the preceding data, rights would be allocated as
indicated:
Solutions: Acre-Feet of Water Allocated Under:
Pasadenawith
Pasadena without
Los Angeles*
Exemption*
Exemption
Party

A
B

16.7
33.3

5.0
50.0
(0.0)

16.7
50.0
(0.0)

C

33.3

D

50.0

E

66.7

30.0
(5.0)
57.5
(5.0)
60.0
(10.0)

33.3
(8.3)
50.0
(0.0)
50.0
(0.0)

200.0
200.0
200.0
Total
*Numbers in parentheses indicate amount of prescriptive right.
The procedure utilized in the "Pasadena without exemption" solution
is of course the pro rata method utilized in the Pasadena case. The "with
exemption" variation is computed by applying the pro rata solution only
with regard to unexempted water which in this case is A's 25 acre-feet.
The portion of unexempted water allocated to each party is determined by
a comparison of the amount of unexempted and prescriptively taken water
to the total of such water pumped by all parties during the five years of
the overdraft. If such a solution were used in this example, hardship would
inequitably fall upon A contrary to the court's policy of allowing no one
to be substantially deprived of a water right. At 1299.
The Los Angeles solution, on the other hand, preserves the amount of
water which A would take under the "Pasadena without exemption" solution. The water lost prescriptively is simply the difference between A's
former right and the right determined under the "Pasadenawith exemption"
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the procedural difficulty of acquiring prescriptive rights
with the limited amount of water to which prescriptive title
may be gained, the Los Angeles decision has made the speculative acquisition of prescriptive rights less attractive than
other possibilities, though it has not completely eliminated
the possibility of an exempted party taking groundwater
from an unprotected user without compensation. To the
extent that the acquisition of prescripive rights is deterred
by the Los Angeles decision, the resources of large producers
and distributors should now be turned to development of
secured sources of water, with the concomitant rewards for
planning of water needs.
CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court in its Los Angeles decision has moved a great distance from its earlier decision. The
exemption of cities and the strengthening of the notice requirement may very well remove the legal impetus for overdevelopment of groundwater basins caused by Pasadena.
California's experience justifies the warning of one influential commentator who noted that
[I]n choosing between social arrangements within
the context of which individual decisions are made,
we have to bear in mind that a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in
some directions may well lead to a worsening of
others. 7
As the demands for groundwater increase with development of other natural resources, states may feel the need to
apply a pro rata solution to overdrafting. This need may be
felt particularly when to do otherwise would result in an
economic interest being left without sufficient water to continue in existence. The legal mechanism administering the
groundwater is then asked to choose between competing interests. It may appear at that juncture that the disruption
solution. The extent of any party's possible prescriptive right is then determined by the difference between his total right under a "Pasadena without exemption" solution and his former right. The water lost by prescription is then allocated by the priority principle which in this case results in
E gaining nothing by his pumping beyond safe yield.
67. Coase, supra note 18, at 44.
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which might result from application of the established rule,
be it appropriation or whatever, would simply be too harmful. To the extent that the legal system lessens the certainty
of ownership of water rights or distorts the value of such
rights by applying a pro rata solution, it may face more
costly long-term disruption. Before applying a pro rata solution, states should ponder the postscript written by the Los
Angeles decision to this "novel" application of equitable apportionment, and use that rule, such as prior appropriation,
which best insures certainty of ownership and facilitates
long-range planning of water utilization.
J. NICHOLAS MURDOCK
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